University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2003

On the Psychology of Punishment
Cass R. Sunstein

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Cass R. Sunstein, "On the Psychology of Punishment," 11 Supreme Court Economic Review 171 (2003).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

On the Psychology of Punishment
Cass R. Sunstein*

Are juries rationalor irrational?In the context of punitive
damage awards, jury decisions suffer from serious problems.
Jurorsare intuitive retributivists,in a way that produces departuresfrom economic theories of punishment. Their decisions arerooted in outrage, which they cannot easily translate into dollar terms. The result is a degree of unpredictability
and incoherence. An understandingof this point casts light
on several problems with existing institutionsand offers
some clues abouthow those problems might be solved.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Judgments about punishment are typically a product of outrage about
the underlying acts.' Inside as well as outside of law, punitive acts
are undertaken when people have been wronged. When legislators
penalize misconduct, they are typically responsive to the outrage
of their constituents. And when juries punish unlawful acts, either
through sentencing or through punitive damage awards, they are of2
ten motivated by outrage.
In this essay I defend these points, and use them to make two ma* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago, Law
School and Department of Political Science. This essay is a revised version of a paper
presented at a conference on The Law and Economics of Irrational Behavior at George
Mason University Law School on Nov. 1, 2002. I am most grateful to participants in
the conference for their helpful reactions, and to Daniel Kahneman and David
Schkade, my coauthors on the work discussed here.
IJonathan Baron and Ilana Ritov, Intuitions About Penaltiesand Compensationin
the Context of Tort Law, 7 J Risk & Uncertainty 17 (1993).
2 See Cass R. Sunstein et al, Assessing PunitiveDamages, 107 Yale L J 2071 (1998).
© 2004 by the University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0-226-64593-2/2004/0011-0005$10.00
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jor claims about the relationship between outrage and legal punishments. The first is that it is extremely difficult to translate outrage
into the terms that the legal system makes relevant. Because of the
difficulty of this task, the legal system risks incoherence in the sense
of erratic and unpredictable patterns. Precisely because of the unpredictability of particular awards, these patterns show a kind of irrationality. The second claim is that when people make one-shot judgments, as juries typically do, they are likely to produce patterns that
they themselves would repudiate. The result is another kind of incoherence-incoherence not in the sense of unpredictability, but in the
sense of patterns that are extremely hard to justify. To that extent the
patterns are irrational.
Taken together, these points help to support the Supreme Court's
extraordinary decision in State Farm Mutual InsuranceCo. v. Campbell, 3 in which the Court attempted to discipline punitive awards by
juries, in part by suggesting that the punitive award should ordinarily
not be more than nine times higher than the compensatory award.4
The same concerns about unpredictability and incoherence clarify
the argument for a number of legal institutions, including the United
States Sentencing Commission and various institutions entrusted
with producing workers' compensation awards.5 The same points also
raise questions about existing practice in many domains, including
the awarding of punitive damages by juries, the system of civil penalties by administrative agencies, and compensatory awards in several
areas of law, involving, for example, libel, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, pain and suffering, and sexual harassment. I will
urge that an understanding of the dynamics of outrage casts light on
problems and potential reforms in a variety of areas of law.
In making these claims, I will draw on, and attempt to generalize,
a series of experimental studies of punitive damage awards. 6 The resulting work, much of it highly technical, seems to me to have
broader implications for a range of issues in both law and politics. If
punishment judgments are typically a function of outrage, the problems found in jury behavior might well have analogies in criminal
sentencing and administrative fines. If outrage is difficult to translate
3

123 S Ct 1513 (2002).

4 Id.

I A helpful overview is Price Fishback and Shawn Kantor, A Prelude to the Welfare
State: The Origins of Workers Compensation(Chicago 1999).
6 See Daniel Kahneman et al, Shared Outrageand UnpredictableAwards, 16 J Risk
& Uncertainty 47 (1998); Sunstein, 107 Yale L J at 2071 (cited in note 2); David Schkade
et al., DeliberatingAbout Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 Colum L Rev 1139 (2000);
Cass R. Sunstein et al, Do People Want Optimal Deterrence, 29 J Legal Stud 237
(2000); Cass R. Sunstein et al, PredictablyIncoherentJudgments, 54 Stan L Rev 1153
(2002). Many of these papers are collected, in revised and abbreviated versions, in Cass
R. Sunstein et al, Punitive Damages:How Juries Decide (Chicago 2002).
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into dollars or years, we might be able to understand seemingly unjustified disparities from both agencies and courts, and also to see
what might be done about those disparities. If people's outrage, when
faced with an individual case, produces patterns that people cannot
accept, we might be able to identify serious problems with both civil
and criminal punishment. In investigating some of these issues, I
draw throughout on our empirical findings, but in a way that involves
my own extrapolations, some of them admittedly speculative. One of
my hopes is that the whole is larger than the sum of the parts. For
purposes of the present discussion, I will speak broadly and in qualitative terms. Readers interested in numbers and statistical analysis
might consult the papers from which I draw.
II. RETRIBUTION AND OUTRAGE: WHERE
PUNISHMENT STARTS
Let us begin with the question of appropriate punishment. On the
economic account, the state's goal, when imposing penalties, is to ensure optimal deterrence. 7 To increase deterrence, the law might increase the severity of punishment, or instead increase the likelihood
of punishment. A government that lacks substantial enforcement resources might impose high penalties, thinking that it will produce
the right deterrent signal in light of the fact that many people will escape punishment altogether. A government that has sufficient resources might impose a lower penalty, but enforce the law against all
or almost all violators.
A. Probability of Detection
In the context of punitive damages, all this leads to a simple theory:
the major purpose of such damages is to make up for the shortfall in
enforcement.8 If injured people are 100% likely to receive compensation, there is no need for punitive damages. If injured people are 50%
likely to receive compensation, those who bring suit should receive a
punitive award that is twice the amount of the compensatory award.
The simple exercise in multiplication will ensure optimal deterrence. But do people actually want optimal deterrence? Do they accept or reject the economic theory of punishment?
Three simple experiments cast light on these questions.9 In the
7

See William Landes and Richard Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 16065, 184-85, 223-24 (Harvard 1993).
' See A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 Harv L Rev 869, 870-76 (1998).
9 See Sunstein, 29 J Legal Stud 237 (cited in note 6); W Kip Viscusi, The Challenge
of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J Legal Stud 313 (2001).

HeinOnline -- 11 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 173 2003

174

On the Psychology of Punishment

first, people were given cases of wrongdoing, arguably calling for punitive damages, and they were also provided with explicit information
about the probability of detection. Different people saw the same
case, with only one difference: varying probability of detection (by a
factor of 20). People were asked about the amount of punitive damages that they would choose to award. The goal was to see if people
would impose higher punishments when the probability of detection
was low.

The basic finding was clear.' 0 Varying the probability of detection
had no effect on punitive awards. Even when people's attention was
explicitly directed to the probability of detection, people were indifferent to it. In fact, there was a modest increase in awards when
the probability of detection was high, though the difference was not
statistically significant. Hence people's decisions about appropriate
punishment were largely unaffected by seeing a high or low probability of detection. The evident reason for this result is that people focus
on the outrageousness of the defendant's actions, not on the likelihood that they will be detected." Now it is possible that altering the
likelihood of detection could increase or decrease outrage. If a corporate defendant was certain to be caught, but nonetheless dumped pollutants into drinking water, it might seem to be brazen, incorrigible,
a kind of sadist, entirely deserving of serious punishment. And if a
corporate defendant engaged in some act in an especially stealthy
way, showing a real skill at evading the law, people might want to punish it especially severely, on the ground that stealth and skill are
grounds for heightened outrage. But in either case, a high or low likelihood of detection is operating not in the economic fashion, as part
of a deterrence calculus, but instead as a part of an inquiry into the
egregiousness of the acts.
There was something indirect about the first experiment: It showed
people the probability of detection, but it did not ask them to evaluate judgments that took probability into account. The second experiment filled that gap. 12 It asked people to evaluate judicial and executive decisions to reduce penalties when the probability of detection
was high, and to increase penalties when the probability of detection
was low. People were asked to say whether they approved or disapproved of official decisions to vary the penalty with the probability of
detection. Strikingly, strong majorities of respondents rejected judicial decisions to reduce penalties because of high probability of detection, and also rejected executive decisions to increase penalties be10See Sunstein, 29 J Legal Stud 237 (cited in note 6).

1 We will see further evidence of this in Part I below.
12See Sunstein, 29 J Legal Stud 237 (cited in note 6).
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cause of low probability of detection. In other words, people did not
approve of an approach to punishment that would make the level of
punishment vary with the probability of detection. What apparently
concerned them was the extent of the wrongdoing, and the right degree of moral outrage rather than optimal deterrence.
A third study was the most direct of all. 13 This study asked people
to undertake a deterrence calculus, based squarely on the compensatory award and the probability of detection. All the necessary information was placed before jurors. The result was that people did not
successfully perform the elementary calculations. Errors were pervasive. From this experiment, it is not entirely clear whether people
erred because they were unable to do what they were asked, or because they refused to do it, on the ground that it ran afoul of their
moral convictions. But in either case, it is clear that people do not
spontaneously think in terms of optimal deterrence, and indeed, they
will fail to do so even if specifically requested to engage in that task.
The most general conclusion is that people are intuitive retributivists. Their moral intuitions are inconsistent with the economic
theory of deterrence. Those intuitions are grounded in outrage.
B. Pointless Punishment?

Other studies support these findings. For example, Baron and Ritov
studied people's judgments about penalties in tort cases involving
harms resulting from the use of vaccines and birth control pills. 14 In

one case, subjects were told that the result of a higher penalty would
be to make companies try harder to make safer products. In an adjacent case, subjects were told that the consequence of a higher penalty
would be to make the company more likely to stop making the product, with the result that less safe products would be on the market.
Most subjects, including a group of judges, gave the same penalties in
both cases.
A related study found no reduction in penalty even when subjects
were told that the amount of the penalty would have no effect on future behavior-because the penalty was secret, the company had insurance, and the company was about to go out of business.,' This
study strongly suggests that punishment judgments are retributive in
character, not tailored to consequentialist goals.
Another test of punishment judgments asked subjects, including
both judges and legislators, to choose penalties for dumping hazardous
'3
'4
's

See Viscusi, 30 J Legal Stud 313 (cited in note 9).
Baron, 7 J Risk & Uncertainty 17 (cited in note 1).
See id.
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waste. 16 In one case, the penalty would make companies try harder to
avoid waste. In another, the penalty would lead companies to cease
making a beneficial product. Most people did not penalize companies
differently in the two cases. Perhaps most strikingly, people preferred
to require companies to clean up their own waste, even if the waste
did not threaten anyone, instead of spending the same amount to
clean up far more dangerous waste produced by another, now-defunct
company. These studies indicate that when assessing punishment,
people's judgments are rooted in outrage; they do not focus solely on
social consequences, at least not in any simple way.
C. Cost-Benefit Analysis
A related test of punitive intuitions attempted to explore whether jurors would punish or reward companies that conducted a competent
cost-benefit analysis before proceeding.17 The test asked people to assess different scenarios involving safety precautions. In some of them,
the company did no explicit cost-benefit analysis, but simply concluded that the company "thought that there might be some risk
from the current design, but did not believe it would be significant."
In other scenarios, companies engaged in cost-benefit analysis, with
varying amounts used to value life (from $800,000 to $4 million). The
key question is this: Will people reward or punish companies that
have explicitly weighed costs against benefits?
The answer is that people do not react favorably to this kind of
weighing. 8 A company that engages in cost-benefit balancing is very
likely to face a punitive award, and the award that it faces is likely to be
high. In fact, companies that place a high monetary value on human
life are likely to face especially high awards. By contrast, people do not
much punish companies that are willing to impose a risk on people. 19
There is a real oddity here: If the costs of precautions outweigh the
benefits, then companies should not, under ordinary understandings,
be deemed negligent at all. If jurors are punishing companies in such
circumstances, it must be because of a kind of moral outrage that has
little to do with either efficiency or law.20 And why are awards espe16 Jonathan Baron, R. Gowda, and Howard Kunreuther, Attitudes toward Managing
Hazardous Waste: What Should be Cleaned Up and Who Should Pay for It, 13 Risk
Analysis 183 (1993);
17 See W Kip Viscusi, CorporateRisk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 Stan L Rev
547 (2000).
18 See id.
'9 See id; see also Philip Tetlock, Coping With Tradeoffs, in Elements of Reason:
Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality 239 (Cambridge, 2000).
20 What underlies these judgments? I cannot fully answer that question here. But a
careful look raises the possibility that people are outraged by any explicit decision to
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cially high when companies place a high value on human life? The
most likely answer is that jurors have a difficult time in coming up
with dollar amounts to punish misconduct and that a high value operates as an anchor, leading to high punitive judgments. 2' This point
directly bears on the problem of translating moral judgments into
monetary terms, to which I will shortly turn.
Is it irrational to root punishment judgments in outrage? There is
no simple answer. Many distinguished observers have argued in favor
of retributive conceptions of punishment, and there is a clear connection between retribution and outrage. 22 To the extent that people
are using a kind of "outrage heuristic," they cannot be shown to be
making the sorts of errors to which ordinary heuristics sometimes
lead them.23 On the other hand, it is possible to worry about the potentially harmful social consequences of a system of punishment
that is rooted in outrage. I share that worry; but to those who believe
in the rationality of outrage, or in retribution generally, the issue cannot be resolved without a complex normative argument. If we have irtrade money for risks. When they are generalizing from a set of moral principles that
are generally sound, and even useful, but that work poorly in some cases. Consider the
following moral principle: Do not knowingly cause a human death. People disapprove
of companies that fail to improve safety when they are fully aware that deaths will result-whereas people do not disapprove of those who fail to improve safety while appearing not to know, for certain, that deaths will ensue. When people object to risky
action taken after cost-benefit analysis, it seems to be partly because that very analysis
puts the number of expected deaths squarely "on screen!' Companies that fail to do
such analysis, but that are aware that a risk exists, do not make clear, to themselves or
to jurors, that they caused deaths with full knowledge that this was what they were going to do. People disapprove, above all, of companies that cause death knowingly. I suggest, then, that a genuine heuristic is at work, one that imposes moral condemnation
on those who knowingly engage in acts that will result in human deaths. The problem
is that it is not always unacceptable to cause death knowingly, at least if the deaths are
relatively few and an unintended byproduct of generally desirable activity. If government allows new highways to be built, it will know that people will die on those highways; if government allows new power plants to be built, it will know that some people
will die from the resulting pollution; if companies produce tobacco products, and if
government does not ban those products, hundreds of thousands of people will die; the
same is true for alcohol. Much of what is done, by both industry and government, is
likely to result in one or more deaths. Of course, it would make sense in most or all of
these domains, to take extra steps to reduce risks. But that proposition does not support the implausible claim that we should disapprove, from the moral point of view, of
any action taken when deaths are foreseeable.
21 See Cass R. Sunstein, HazardousHeuristics,U Chi L Rev (forthcoming 2002).
22See David Owen, The MoralFoundationsof Punitive Damages,40 Ala L Rev 705
(1989); Marc Galanter and David Luban, Poetic Justice, 42 Am U L Rev 1393 (1993);
Jean Hampton, The RetributiveIdea, in Jean Hampton and Jeffrie Murphy, Forgiveness
and Mercy 111 (Cambridge 1988).
23 The key papers can be found in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds, Judgment Under Uncertainty:Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge 1982).
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rationality here, it is not irrationality in any simple sense. But for the
legal system, the use of outrage does lead to serious problems, as we
shall now see.
III. THE TRANSLATION

PROBLEM

Punitive judgments are rooted in outrage; but do people agree about
the appropriate level of outrage? Imagine that diverse Americans are
confronted with a case of clear wrongdoing. Should we expect a sharp
divergence if they are asked to answer, on a bounded numerical scale,
"how bad was the underlying conduct?" I now offer evidence suggesting that people's outrage is widely shared, but that the consensus
breaks down when people are asked to translate their outrage into
dollars. The Supreme Court's evident concern about arbitrary punitive awards 24 has a sound basis in the psychology of punishment, as
we shall now see.
A. Shared Outrage
A series of studies of citizen judgments demonstrates that at least in
some domains, people agree about the degree of outrage that appropriately fits social misconduct. 25 At least if people use a bounded
scale (of, say, 0 to 6 or 0 to 8) with accompanying verbal descriptions
("not at all outrageous" for 0 and "extremely outrageous" for 6 or 8),
a high degree of social agreement is likely. In personal injury cases,
the judgment of any particular group of six is likely to provide a good
prediction of the judgment of any other group of six. In this sense, a
"moral judgment" jury is indeed able to serve as the conscience of
the community.
In one study, people were asked to assess the outrageousness of the
defendant's conduct on a bounded scale, and separately to say how
much the defendant should be punished on that scale. Two striking
facts emerged. The first was an extraordinary degree of correlation between judgments of outrageousness and judgments about appropriate
punishment-a finding that confirms the suggestion in Part I that
punishment judgments are rooted in outrage. 26 The second was a high
degree of regularity in both sets of judgments, so that people tend to
rank and to rate diverse cases in essentially the same way. At least in
a set of highly varying personal injury cases, people's punishment
judgments do not significantly diverge, and the assessment of one
jury is a good predictor of the assessment of another.
24

25

State Farm Mut Ins Co v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2002).
See Sunstein, 107 Yale L J at 2071 (cited in note 2); Schkade, 100 Colum L Rev at

1139 (cited in note 6).
26 See Sunstein, 107 Yale L J at 2071 (cited in note 2).
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Indeed we can go further. Members of different demographic groups
show considerable agreement about how to rank and rate personal injuries cases.2 7 Thousands of people were asked to rank and rate cases.
Information was elicited about the demographic characteristics of all
of those people. As a result, it is possible, with the help of the computer, to put individuals together, so as to assemble all-male juries, allfemale juries, all-white juries, all-African-American juries, all-poor
juries, all-rich juries, all-educated juries, all less-educated juries, and
so forth. Creating "statistical juries" in this way, there were no substantial disagreements, in terms of rating or ranking, within any group.
In personal injury cases, people largely agree with one another.
Subsequent work has broadened this finding, showing that people
agree on how to rank tax violations, environmental violations, and
occupational safety and health violations. 28 From this evidence, it
seems reasonable to hypothesize that in a wide range of domains,
people will agree how to rank and rate cases. The moral norms within
a heterogeneous culture are, to that extent, widely shared, and strikingly so. Now this does not mean that people will agree on how to
rank cases from different categories (a point to which I will return).
Nor does it mean that small groups will always agree on how to do the
ranking. Nor does it mean that demographically diverse groups will
agree about how to rate cases in contentious areas of the law-consider sexual harassment or racial discrimination. But the findings do
suggest that within category, disagreement about both outrage and
punishment is the exception, not the rule.
B. Erratic Dollar Awards
There is a consensus about the appropriate level of outrage. But even
when that consensus exists, there is no consensus about appropriate
punishment in terms of dollars. As we shall see, the reason for the
lack of consensus lays in particular properties of the dollar scale. The
scale of years in jail, used for criminal punishment, suffers from similar problems.
With respect to dollars, both individuals and jury-size groups are
all over the map. 29 Even when moral rankings are shared-as they
generally are-dollar awards are extremely variable. A group that
awards a "5," for defendant's misconduct, might give a dollar award of
$500,000, or $2 million, or $10 million. A group that awards a "7"
might award $1 million, or $10 million, or $100 million. In fact, there
27Id.
28See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Legal Coherence and Incoherence (unpublished man-

uscript, 2001).
29 See Sunstein, 107 Yale L J at 2071 (cited in note 2); Schkade, 100 Colum L Rev at
1139 (cited in note 6).
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is so much noise, in the dollar awards, that differences cannot be connected with demographic characteristics. It is not as if one groupwhites for example-give predictably different awards from anothersay African-Americans or Hispanics. We cannot show systematic differences between young and old, men and women, well-educated
and less well-educated. The real problem is that dollar awards are
quite unruly, from one individual to another and from one small group
to another.
C. Why Are Awards Erratic?
These findings raise an obvious question: why are erratic dollar
awards found amidst shared moral judgments? The best answer involves the problem of translating outrage into dollars. More particularly, the answer is that the effort to "map" moral judgments onto
dollars is an exercise in "scaling without a modulus. 30 In psychology,
it is well known that serious problems will emerge when people are
asked to engage in a rating exercise on a scale that is bounded at the
bottom but not at the top, and when they are not given a "modulus"
by which to make sense of various points along the scale. For example, when people are asked to rate the brightness of lights, or the
loudness of noises, they will not be able to agree if no modulus is supplied and if the scale lacks an upper bound. But once a modulus is
supplied, agreement is substantially improved. Or if the scale is given
an upper bound, and if verbal descriptions accompany some of the
relevant points, people will come into accord with one another.
The upshot is that much of the observed variability with punitive
damage awards-and in all likelihood with other damage awards toodoes not come from differences in levels of outrage. It comes from
variable, and inevitably somewhat arbitrary "moduli" selected by individual jurors and judges. If the legal system wants to reduce the
problem of different treatment of the similarly situated, it would do
well to begin by appreciating this aspect of the problem. The point applies to many legal problems, including criminal sentences, pain and
suffering awards, administrative penalties, and damages for libel, sexual harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In
these areas as well, those entrusted with the task of "mapping" lack
a modulus with which to discipline their decisions. An empirical
study of pain and suffering awards finds that no less than forty percent of the variance cannot be explained by differences in case characteristics. 3' A legal system that does not give guidance for "map30 Schkade,

100 Colum L Rev at 1139 (cited in note 6).

"' David Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Priorto Death,
64 NYU L Rev 256 (1989).
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ping" is bound to create similar problems in other areas. Indeed, the
rise of guidelines for criminal sentencing can be understood as responsive, at least in part, to exactly this problem.
D. The Effects of Deliberation
The study just described involved individual judgments, aggregated,
with the aid of the computer, so as to produce statistical jurors. A subsequent study tested the effects of deliberation on both punitive intentions and dollar judgments. 32 The study involved about 3000 juryeligible citizens; its major purpose was to determine how individuals
would be influenced by seeing and discussing the punitive intentions
of others. To test the effects of deliberation on punitive intentions,
people were asked to record their individual judgments privately, on a
bounded scale, and then to join six-member groups to generate unanimous "punishment verdicts." Hence, subjects were asked to record,
in advance of deliberation, a "punishment judgment" on a scale of 0
to 8, where 0 indicated that the defendant should not be punished at
all, and 8 indicated that the defendant should be punished extremely
severely. After the individual judgments were recorded, jurors were
asked to deliberate to a unanimous "punishment verdict."
Two findings are especially important. First, deliberation made the
lower punishment ratings decrease, when compared to the median of
pre-deliberation judgments of individuals-while deliberation made
the higher punishments ratings increase, when compared to that same
median. When the individual jurors favored little punishment, the
group showed a "leniency shift," meaning a rating that was systematically lower than the median predeliberation rating of individual
members.3 3 But when individual jurors favored strong punishment, the
group as a whole produced a "severity shift," meaning a rating that was
systematically higher than the median predeliberation rating of individual members.3 4 When the median juror judgment was less than35
four, the jury's verdict was below the median judgment of individuals.
The second important finding is that dollar awards of groups were
systematically higher than the median of individual group members-so much so that in 27% of the cases, the dollar verdict was as
high as, or higher than, that of the highest individual judgment, predeliberation. The basic result is that deliberation causes awards to increase, and it causes high awards to increase a great deal. The effect of
deliberation, in increasing dollar awards, was most pronounced in the
32
33

Schkade, 100 Colum L Rev 1139 (cited in note 6).
Id. at 1152, 1154-55.

341d.
35 id.
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case of high awards. For example, the median individual judgment, in
a case involving a defective yacht, was $450,000, whereas the median
jury judgment, in that same case, was $1,000,000. 3 6 But awards
37
shifted upwards for low awards as well.
These findings create many puzzles. For present purposes, the key
point is that the translation problem is not cured by deliberating bodies. On the contrary, the problem of unpredictability is increased, not
decreased, by the existence of deliberation. If we are seeking an explanation for the movements that are observed, the best answer lies
in the phenomenon of group polarization. 38 This is the pervasive process by which group members end up in a more extreme position in
line with the predeliberation tendencies of group members. It is predicted, according to group polarization, that high levels of outrage
will be increased by deliberation, and that low levels of outrage will
be decreased by deliberation. Nor do such movements present any
real puzzles for rationality. A central reason for group polarization involves the exchange of information within the group. In a group that
favors a high punishment rating, group members will make many arguments in that direction, and relatively few the other way. Speaking
purely descriptively, the group's "argument pool" will be skewed in
the direction of severity. Group members, listening to the various arguments, will naturally move in that direction.
In the context of actual dollar awards by juries, a particular finding
deserves emphasis. 39 As I have noted, the highest awards increased by
the largest amount, but all awards increased. This might appear to be
a surprise. An understanding of group polarization might suggest that
low awards would drop and high awards would be raised, with the difference pivoting around some neutral point, say, $60,000. But this
is not what was observed. Why did dollar awards systematically increase? A possible explanation, consistent with group polarization, is
that any positive median award suggests a predeliberation tendency
to punish, and deliberation aggravates that tendency by increasing
awards. But even if correct, this explanation seems insufficiently specific. The striking fact is that those arguing for higher awards seem
to have an automatic "rhetorical advantage" over those arguing for
lower awards. A subsequent study of supported this finding, suggesting that given prevailing social norms, people find it much easier to
defend higher awards against corporate defendants than the opposite.40 If this is so, then processes of deliberation will naturally lead
36

Id. at 1152.

371d.
3

s See Roger Brown, SocialPsychology: The Second Edition (Simon & Schuster 1990).
'9 See Schkade, 100 Colum L Rev 1139 at 1149-1151 (cited in note 6).
40 Id at 1161-62.
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to jury awards that are systematically higher than the award of the
median individual member in advance of deliberation.
My major goal here, however, is not to investigate the sources of
movements in awards, but to suggest that group deliberation does not
solve the translation problem. Deliberating juries, no less than statistical juries, show a high degree of consensus about appropriate
punishment (and hence outrage). Deliberating juries, even more than
statistical juries, show a high degree of variability in terms of appropriate dollar awards.
IV. OUTRAGE, PUNISHMENT, AND CONTEXT
I now turn to the largest puzzles of all. Thus far, it has seemed as if
people's moral judgments are quite stable. But that proposition was
established only by looking at a set of personal injury cases. Here the
relevant level of outrage is both predictable and coherent, in the sense
that people's judgments are not much affected by whether they are
seeing cases in isolation or simultaneously and in the context of
other cases from the same category. But is this coherence maintained
when people look at cases from different categories? Suppose, for example, that people are evaluating personal injury cases and cases involving commercial fraud, and that similar people are evaluating personal injury cases and cases involving rape and murder. Would the
judgments about personal injury cases remain stable across these various contexts? Are judgments about cases different, depending on
whether those cases are seen in isolation or in the context of cases
from other categories?
We do not have full answers to these questions; but suggestive evidence has started to emerge. 4' It appears that people agree on how to
rank cases within categories and that their judgments about particular cases are not affected by seeing them in isolation or alongside other
cases within the same categories. 42 It also appears that people have a
kind of implicit ranking of categories themselves; they think that
murder is worse than rape, that rape is worse than assault, and that
assault is worse than libel. But when people are trying to rank cases
from different categories, they have far more difficulty, in the sense
that they are unsure exactly what to do. They are not certain, for example, whether a relatively bad income tax violation is worse than a
relatively not-so-bad occupational safety and health violation. 3 This
lack of certainty translates into a lack of consensus. People agree
41

See Sunstein, 54 Stan L Rev 1153 (cited in note 6).

42

See Sunstein, 107 Yale L J at 2071 (cited in note 2).

43

See Sunstein, Legal Coherence and Incoherence (cited in note 25).
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much more on how to rank cases within a category than how to rank
cases across categories. Note that I am putting aside the evident difficulties in deciding what counts as a "category." It is easy to design
experiments in which people will simply disagree about whether,
for example, a comparatively serious tax violation is worse, or less
bad, than a lawless act that harms the environment. Hence, the social norms that govern cross-category comparisons are not as widely
shared as the social norms that govern within-category comparisons.
It follows that judgments about outrage, and about appropriate punishment, are more variable across categories than within categories.
Perhaps this is not big news. A more striking finding is that people's
judgments about cases, taken one at a time, are very different from
their judgments about the same cases, taken in the context of a problem from another category.44 For example, people were asked to assess
a case involving a personal injury, on a bounded punishment scale and
also on a dollar scale. People were also asked to assess a case involving financial injury, on a bounded punishment scale and also on a
dollar scale. The financial injury involved relatively egregious misconduct, such as a violation of trust by a trustee, for the benefit of a
favored client; the personal injuries were relatively less egregious,
such as an injury caused to a driver when a steering system failed. The
basic goal was to ask people to assess, in isolation but then in comparison, a financial injury case that would seem outrageous for its
type, and a personal injury case that would seem less outrageous for
its type.
Here is what emerged.45 When each of the two cases is judged in
isolation, the financial injury case receives a more severe punishment
rating and a higher dollar award. But when the two cases are seen together, there is a significant judgment shift, in which people try to ensure that the financial award is not much higher, and for many respondents is lower, than the personal injury award. The upshot is that
people's decisions about the two cases are very different, depending
on whether they see the case alone or in the context of a case from an46

other category.

Exactly the same kind of shift was observed for judgments about
two problems calling for government regulation and expenditures: research on bone marrow cancer among the elderly and protection of
coral reefs by banning of cyanide fishing.47 Looking at the two cases
in isolation, people are willing to pay about the same to protect coral
reefs, and register more satisfaction, on a bounded scale, from doing
"See Sunstein, 54 Stan L Rev at 1173-1178 (cited in note 6).
5
4 Id at 1176.
4Id.
7
4 Id at 1176-1177.
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that. But looking at the two cases together, people will be quite disturbed at this pattern, and will want to pay significantly more to protect elderly people from cancer and will also register more satisfaction from doing that. Here too there is a significant shift in judgment.
In these findings, the translation problem is not the source of the
difficulty. People's evaluations shift depending on whether they see
cases in isolation or in the context of cases from other categories.
What accounts for these shifts? Let me offer a preliminary account.
When people see a case in isolation, they naturally normalize it by
comparing it to a set of comparison cases that it readily calls up. If
people are asked whether a German Shepherd is big or small, they are
likely to respond that it is big; if they are asked whether a Volkswagen Bug is big or small, they are likely to respond that it is small. But
people are well aware that a German Shepherd is smaller that a Volkswagen bug. People answer as they do because a German Shepherd is
compared with dogs, whereas a Volkswagen Bug is compared with
cars. So far, so good; in these cases, everyone knows what everyone
else means. We easily normalize judgments about size, and the normalization is mutually understood. Another example is John Stockton, who is about six feet tall, and hence a small basketball player.
What happens, in ordinary communication, is innocuous. It does not
breed error or confusion.
In the context of legally relevant moral judgments, something similar happens, but it is far from innocuous. When evaluating a case involving financial injury, people apparently normalize the defendant's
conduct by comparing it with conduct in other cases from the same
category. They do not easily or naturally compare that defendant's
conduct with conduct from other categories. Because of the natural
comparison set, people are likely to be quite outraged by the misconduct, if it is far worse than what springs naturally to mind. The same
kind of thing happens with the problem of bone marrow cancer among
the elderly. People compare that problem with other similar problems, and conclude that it is not so serious, within the category of
health-related or cancer-related problems. The same is true with personal injury cases (normalized against other personal injury cases)
and problems involving damage to coral reefs (normalized against
other cases of ecological harm).
When a case from another category is introduced, this natural process of comparison is disrupted. Rather than comparing a cancer case
involving the elderly with other cancers, or other human health risks,
people see that it must be compared with ecological problems, which
(in most people's view) have a lesser claim to public resources. Rather
than comparing a financial injury case to other cases of business misconduct, people now compare it to a personal injury case, which (in
most people's view) involves more serious wrongdoing. As a result of
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the wider viewscreen, judgments shift, often dramatically. It follows
that if people's informed judgments are taken to be the criterion,
punitive damage awards are likely to be too high in financial injury
cases and too low in personal injury cases. Some data supports this
suggestion. 41 Similar shifts could be produced with many other pairs
of categories. For example, punitive damages awards involving libel
might well be higher, in isolation, than punitive damage awards involving racial discrimination; but there is likely to be a reversal if the
two cases are put together.
It is reasonable to hypothesize that the comparative situation may
alter judgments in another way, by reducing the anchoring effects of
compensatory damages on punitive awards. In the real world of punitive damages, unlike our experiment, compensatory awards are gen49
erally much larger in financial cases than in cases of physical injury.
As a consequence, a case of financial damage with a large compensatory anchor (say $10,000,000) is expected to receive a higher punitive
damage award than a case of physical injury with a smaller anchor
(say $500,000), when the two are judged in isolation. When cases of
the two kinds are directly compared, many people will be more
strongly influenced by the relative prominence of the harms than by
the relative size of the anchors. Preliminary evidence50 supports this
hypothesis, which suggests that two distinct mechanisms may cause
punitive awards for financial cases to be higher in the current system
than they would be if jurors were given a richer context: anchoring on
high dollar numbers, and masking of the low prominence of the category through the effect of normalization.
I believe that this uncovers a serious problem with current practice
in many domains of law. The problem is that when people assess
cases in isolation, their viewscreen is usually narrow, indeed often
limited to the category to which the case belongs, and that as a result,
people produce a pattern of outcomes that makes no sense by their
own lights. In other words, the overall set of outcomes is one that
people would not endorse, if they were only to see it as a whole. Their
considered judgments reject the very pattern that they have produced,
because of a predictable feature of human cognition. The result is a
form of incoherence.
We can find that incoherence not only in jury verdicts, but also in
administrative fines and in criminal sentencing, where no serious
48 See Jonathan Karpoff and John Lott, On the Determinants and Importance of
Punitive Damage Awards, 42 J L & Econ 527, 539 (1999).
49
Id at 538-39, showing mean awards of $14.8 million in fraud cases, and $20.6 million in business negligence cases, but $6.2 million in product liability cases, $1.6 million in malpractice cases, and $991,000 in motor vehicle accident cases.
-0 See Sunstein, Legal Coherence and Incoherence(cited in note 25).
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effort has been made to ensure that the overall pattern of outcomes
makes the slightest sense.5 Indeed there is reason to believe that the
pattern, in many domains, is quite senseless. And it may not be too
much of a stretch to suggest that the same is true of reactions, some
of the time, by both individuals and institutions-that people are
quite outraged about behavior that, in a broader or different comparison set, would outrage them little or not at all.
What should be done by way of legal reform? I cannot answer that
question here. If outrage is the appropriate basis for punishment,
then steps should be taken to ensure that outrage reflects a wide
viewscreen rather than a narrow one, so as to reduce the risk that the
legal system will produce punishment patterns that people reject.
Perhaps the United States Sentencing Commission can be understood partly in this light; and perhaps an emphasis on incoherence
suggests directions in which the Commission might go in the future.
To date, the Commission has made little effort to ensure that penalties cohere across categories.
In the context of punitive damages, the claims I have made suggest
that judges might take a stronger role in overseeing jury awards, in
part to ensure that those awards cohere with what has been done in
other areas of the law. The natural implication is that judges should
decrease unjustifiably high awards and increase unjustifiably low
ones; and indeed the Supreme Court's unexpectedly ambitious ruling
in the State Farm case is a clear step in the direction of imposing discipline on jury awards.5 2 It might be tempting to reject this suggestion
by emphasizing the populist credentials of the jury and by fearing judicial usurpation of the jury's functions. But the translation problem,
and the risk of incoherence from one-shot judgments, demonstrates
that this concern is misplaced, because the decisions of any particular jury do not produce community sentiment about what patterns of
punishment make sense.
Outside of the domain of punitive awards, it would make sense to
try to systematize civil fines in general, so as to ensure that the penalties imposed by, for example, the Environmental Protection Agency
fit well with the penalties imposed by say the Internal Revenue Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration. The discussion thus far suggests that any effort at systematization would present a daunting task. But incoherent judgments are extremely likely in the administrative arena as
well, and at least it would be worthwhile to attempt to correct the
most egregious anomalies.
-5 See Sunstein, 54 Stan L Rev at 1189-1196 (cited in note 6).
52 State Farm Mut Ins Co v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2002).
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CONCLUSION

In this paper I have urged that punishment judgments are rooted in
outrage and that people do not naturally think in terms of optimal deterrence. With respect to punishment, people are intuitive retributivists. I have also suggested that punishment judgments are rooted
in outrage, which is, in an important respect, stable across individuals or at least small groups. But for purposes of operating a legal system, punishments that are based on outrage present two key problems. The first is that the legal system does not attempt to measure
outrage directly, but instead requires people to translate their moral
opprobrium into the unbounded scale of dollars. This act of translation produces unpredictable and arbitrary awards. The second problem is that outrage is category-specific. People's level of outrage is a
function of comparison cases. When they confront a case in isolation,
they evaluate it by comparing it not to the full universe of cases, but
to a natural set of similar cases. When cases from other categories are
introduced, their outrage is shifted. The result is that when making
decisions in isolation, people produce patterns of outcomes that they
themselves repudiate once those decisions are seen together.
These findings raise a number of problems. Economically oriented
observers reject the idea that punishment should be rooted in outrage, which could easily result in too much and too little deterrence.
For those who believe that punishments should not be an outgrowth
of outrage, it is wrong to base civil and criminal punishments on ordinary intuitions. In addition, the translation problem ensures a high
degree of unexplained noise in punishments, resulting in unclear signals to possible defendants and also ensuring that similarly situated
plaintiffs and defendants will not be treated similarly. And for those
who would like to take outrage seriously, and who believe in retributive goals, the existence of incoherence raises serious problems of
its own, above all because it suggests that one-shot judgments by juries will not reflect the levels of outrage that would come from a
wider viewscreen.
For many purposes, outrage is highly desirable from the social point
of view. But when operationalized into legal terms, it tends to produce punishments that are both unpredictable and incoherent, and to
result in systems that fall far short of rationality. I do not suggest that
an understanding of the psychology of punishment clearly supports
any particular set of legal reforms. But such an understanding helps
to explain many problems with existing institutions, and offers a
number of clues about how those problems might be solved.

HeinOnline -- 11 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 188 2003

